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Abstract: Microfinance institutions (MFIs) established to provide the poor with
access to capital have typically operated outside of their countries’ regulated
banking environments. Many have relied on donor grants and low-interest funds
to support loan portfolios and social programs. As MFIs mature they aspire to
become more efficient and attain economic sustainability because hey understand that greater numbers of the poor can be serviced by economically sustainable institutions. Many MFIs collect savings deposits but are often barred from
using them for loans by their countries’ laws. Fonkoze, an MFI in Haiti, has
sought regulated status, which would provide access to deposit assets and enable
Fonkoze to better compete with other MFIs, some of which are regulated subsidiaries of commercial banks. In the midst of political and economic turmoil,
Haiti’s Central Bank has delayed Fonkoze’s transformation. A different solution
is now moving forward, with Fonkoze becoming two entities, Fonkoze Financial
Services and Fonkoze Foundation.

M

ost microfinance institutions (MFIs) have been outside
of or at least partially removed from the banking regulatory system of their respective countries. The poor also
lack access to traditional forms of banking capitalization and are
frequently reliant on donor organizations, typically nongovern-
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mental organizations (NGOs). One such NGO is Fonkoze, which
started in Haiti as an organization to help the poor and grew into
an MFI. Fonkoze started with an office in Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti, and quickly expanded into an organization with 18
branches throughout the country to meet rising demand from the
poor. From its inception in Haiti, Fonkoze has been financed by a
combination of outright donations and loans at below market
interest rates. As with many MFIs, adhering to the mission of providing capital to the poor was more important than profits for
Fonkoze. Financing continuing and growing operations without
access to depositor funds limited operations to whatever could be
raised or borrowed from donors, necessitating continuous rounds
of fund-raising. Like a growing number of MFIs, Fonkoze is in the
process of making the transition from an MFI to a regulated banking institution legally able to mobilize deposit capital for its loan
portfolio. While transformations have been successfully negotiated
in other developing countries, Fonkoze is the first applicant for
transformation in Haiti. Each MFI contemplating transformation
is in a unique situation, but there are similarities as well as countryspecific differences that illustrate the promise and pitfalls of
becoming a regulated financial institution.
Larger MFIs with operating assets in place may not be able to
realize economies of scale without becoming regulated institutions.
Expansion of loan portfolios that could be accommodated by MFI
infrastructure already in place may not be possible, due to funding
constraints. Such constraints can be overcome with the establishment of or access to already existing savings deposits. Becoming a
regulated bank would also mean focusing on profits. Since profits
are not the focus of all MFIs, some may not be candidates for
transformation to regulated institutions. MFIs with missions heavily
tilted toward servicing the poor incur expenses far beyond those of
banking operations that would make transformation to an operationally profitable entity difficult if not impossible. In Bangladesh
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there was concern that a focus on profit-making could reduce service to the existing clientele, 90% of whom were women
(Charitonenko & Rahman, 2002). Programs focusing on serving
the poorest can at best cover 70% of operating costs (Morduch,
2000). Donors believe that as few as 5% of MFIs with a social welfare orientation may be able to attain financial sustainability.
Fonkoze, with its mix of social and educational services as well as
lending to the poor, has been a social-welfare-oriented MFI.
Fonkoze plans to address mission drift, a preeminent issue in MFI
transformation, by splitting its organization into a profitable bank
with plans for becoming regulated and a foundation that would
continue as a separate organization for social services. Splitting the
functions and the funding sources will set up a synergistic relationship. The poor can receive rudimentary education and instruction in running small businesses, making them more creditworthy
borrowers from Fonkoze the foundation and eventually move on to
doing business with Fonkoze the bank.
Competition can also be a motivating factor behind seeking
regulated status. In Haiti, regulated banks have created spin-offs or
have directly entered microfinance. While their services differ
considerably from those offered by Fonkoze, over time and with
perhaps government intervention, they could become dominant
players in an altered lending environment.
Regulation means stepped up reporting requirements and
audited financial statements. For most MFIs receiving support
from multiple donors, financial reporting is nothing new. They
often need to satisfy multiple and time consuming reporting
demands. Some NGOs funding MFIs have also insisted on audited
statements. Transformation to a regulated institution streamlines
these reporting requirements while simultaneously making those
loose requirements more stringent. Regulated institutions are subject to far more scrutiny than unregulated MFIs. Regulation means
higher standards, and the necessity of profitability translates into
focusing on greater operational efficiencies. Regulated unprofitable
banks cannot continue to function while losing money, unlike
unprofitable MFIs. Improving operational efficiency can be a good
Volume 7 Number 2

103

Journal of Microfinance

thing for clients but may move regulated institutions away from
serving the more expensive clientele, the poorest of the poor. As
Fonkoze moves steadily towards transformation, it has much to
learn from the experiences of similar organizations around the
world.
The first two sections of this paper trace the origins of
Fonkoze and place it in the context of recent Haitian history. The
next sections discuss and review microfinance institutions and
banking in other countries and how some of these MFIs have
transformed into regulated banks. The paper proceeds to examine
the banking regulatory body in Haiti, the National Bank of Haiti
(BRH), followed by an overview of MFI competition in Haiti. The
final section and conclusion of the paper describe the impediments
to Fonkoze’s transition toward transformation into a regulated
bank and how these impediments were overcome, allowing the formation of a new entity, Fonkoze Financial Services (FFS), a transitional entity that is partway to achieving that transformation.

Origins of Fonkoze in Haiti
Fr. Joseph Phillipe founded Fonkoze in 1994. One year later it
became a foundation under Haitian law. Since it is a membership
organization, only other organizations, with the exception of political parties, can be members of Fonkoze. Organizations with membership in Fonkoze represent the organized poor. Governance is
through a democratic General Assembly, with organizations having
memberships greater than twenty-five sending two delegates and
those with fewer than twenty-five sending one. The delegates elect
nine members to a Board of Directors.
It was not until 1996 that funding levels began to rise and
Fonkoze began making loans to the poor. In 1996 an organization
of Haitians living in Canada donated $10,000, which was matched
by the Canadian government as seed capital for a loan portfolio.
Soon after that an organization of women in Louisiana, USA,
donated funds. In 1997, the Doen Foundation of the Netherlands
provided a combination grant and loan of $100,000, allowing
Fonkoze to have a major impact on loans to the poor. To assist
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Fonkoze in Haiti, Fonkoze USA was formed in 1997 as an independent 501(c)3 charitable organization incorporated in the
United States with a separate board of directors. Sixty-eight percent of Fonkoze’s loan portfolio is financed through Fonkoze USA.
Funds raised in the United States have come from three sources:
• Progressive Donors: those making tax deductible donations.
• Solidarity Investors: those who loan $1,000 or more for a
period of one year at little or no interest.
• Dedicated Partners: individuals or organizations donating
expertise (Fonkoze, 2004).
Fonkoze requires that borrowers maintain savings deposit
accounts, but because of Haitian banking regulations, it cannot
mobilize those savings for any purposes. The savings are effectively
segregated from Fonkoze’s other accounts by being held in separate
commercial bank accounts.
Meeting rising demand for loans had been possible with the
participation of Fonkoze USA, international donors, and lenders.
Political instability in Haiti in recent years, however, has increased
the difficulty of maintaining donor funding. Satisfying different
reporting requirement of the various NGOs has also become increasingly burdensome particularly since there is no standardization.
Gaining legal access to deposits in order to minimize and possibly
even eliminate the need to continue to seek outside funding, which
is a time consuming and costly pursuit for management, would set
Fonkoze as a bank firmly on the road to self-sufficiency.
Deposits on hand were much greater than the loan portfolio in
both 2001 and 2002, reaching over 270% of the loan portfolio.
Interest paid on deposits held by commercial banks in 2002 was
5% per annum. Fonkoze charged borrowers upwards of 3% interest per month. The spread between rates charged and rates Fonkoze
would need to pay depositors leaves considerable room to cover
operating expenses. Not all deposits would be available for loans.
BRH set reserve requirements at 31%, well above the 8% standard
set by the Basle Capital Accord of 1988 (Basle Committee, 1988).
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Even at this level, considerable deposit funds would be available to
fund a loan portfolio larger than current levels.
In 2001 and 2002 Fonkoze had net operating losses and sustainability ratios of 40% and 54% respectively. These numbers in
isolation would seem to be poor indicators of the ability to survive
without subsidies in the form of donations. Low sustainability
margins, however, reflect both expenditures serving the poor, such
as literacy and business practices classes, and a strategy of purchasing assets in preparation for the transformation into a larger
regulated entity. Transformation would enable Fonkoze to utilize
economies of scale by tapping deposits. With fully staffed branches
throughout the country and considerable fixed assets ready to be
utilized, Fonkoze in 2002 was poised for regulated status and
expansion.

Recent Historical Background
Fonkoze was founded at one of the many turning points in Haitian
history. A military coup had taken over the country from Bertrand
Aristide, the first democratically elected president in Haiti’s history, forcing him into exile. By September 15, 1994, having
exhausted diplomatic negotiations to reinstate the elected president, the United States along with twenty other countries decided
to intervene in Haiti (Ambassade d ‘Haïti, 2004). Four days later
troops landed, and coup leaders stepped down and left the country.
On October 15, Aristide returned from exile and resumed what
had become an abbreviated presidency. In June 1995, former Prime
Minister René Préval was elected president to succeed Aristide,
who could not succeed himself.
Parliamentary elections were held on May 21, 2000. Results
were delayed and then in June Haiti’s top election monitor fled the
country, casting doubt on the election’s legitimacy (Associated
Press, 2000). Even with this hasty departure, local and international observers expressed a willingness to accept the election
results as marred but legitimate. Opposition parties were less sanguine, continuing to express outrage. They accused former
President Aristide’s Lavalas Family Party of fixing the election to
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ensure an overwhelming victory prior to Aristide’s own run for the
presidency later in the year. Led by the United States, the international community rejected the May 2000 elections and subsequently embargoed all aid to Haiti (CIA, 2004). The Haitian
economy has been shrinking since, with approximately $500 million in aid suspended only worsening the plight of 80% of the population already mired in extreme poverty (Janet Matthews, 2004).
In early 2004, unrest fomented by extremists, some of whom
were convicted murderers, participants in the prior military coup,
and retreads from the Baby Doc Duvalier dictatorial regime of the
1980s, led to the late-night February 29 departure of President
Aristide under questionable circumstances. Chief Justice Boniface
Alexandre was sworn in as caretaker president (Janet Matthews,
2004). New elections were scheduled for late 2005. The US military returned with a multinational force to restore order at least in
some portions of the country. The Haitian government functions
were reconstituted without Aristide and the possibility of a
resumption in aid with the promise of stability seemed imminent
in mid-2004.
Corruption and lack of security were rampant before Aristide’s
departure. In June 2003, Police Chief Jean-Robert Faveur resigned
after only a short time on the job. His predecessor had lasted only
three months before he resigned after being accused of a 1991
murder. With law enforcement minimal, Haiti has become a transshipment point for cocaine to Europe and the US, with 15% of all
US cocaine consumption passing through the country (Janet
Matthews, 2004). In 2002 GDP was down 1.5% following a 1.7%
decline in 2001. Inflation was down to 8.7% in 2002 from the
2001 level of 14.2%. There was a run on bank deposits after a
rumor was spread that BRH would require forced conversion of all
US denominated deposits to Haitian gourdes. While exports in
2002 held to 2001 levels, coffee exports, a mainstay of the rural
economy, continued to decline from the 1995 level of $25 million
to just $2.6 million. Manufacturing exports fell from $100 million to $85.9 million, although this was still considerably above
1995’s $30 million. Imports were off by $77 million to $980.2
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million, seven times the level of exports. US currency reserves
dropped to $45 million, barely sufficient to cover two weeks of
imports. Foreign investment undaunted by political instability rose
slightly in 2002 to $99.1 million, more than double the
1995–1998 annual averages (Janet Matthews, 2004).
The budget deficit rose to 3% of GDP as taxes fell to just 5.3%
of GDP, covering only 50% of government expenditures. The IMF
in 2003 called for privatization of telecommunications and energy
along with substantial infrastructure improvements. It would be
difficult to imagine where the funds to accomplish any rebuilding
would come from other than foreign aid, which in 2001 had fallen
to $20.40 per capita from $43.40 in 1997, significant sums in a
country where average wages are $1.20 per day (CIA, 2004).

MFIs and Banking in Other Countries
Microfinance institutions’ ability to attract capital is in part dependent on the stability of the country’s political climate (Campion &
White, 2001). Sri Lanka’s experience of political unrest impinging
on commercial development (Charitonenko & de Silva, 2002)
could be instructive to countries like Haiti undergoing similar
disruption. Indonesia also endured sectarian violence, but the
government introduced enabling measures to assist in microfinance
development (Afwan & Charitonenko, 2003). In Bangladesh,
creating an MFI enabling environment is not the highest priority
of a government that has been faced with occasional instability.
Even so, government subsidies do contribute to enhancing the
41% of loanable funds that come from donations to MFIs
(Charitonenko & Rahman, 2002).
Some countries, recognizing the lack of capital and banking
services available to the poor, often encouraged and assisted the
establishment of institutions. In the Philippines the Rural Banking
Act of 1952 promoted the establishment of rural banks. The
Central Bank of the Philippines (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, BSP)
provided free technical assistance and access to loans at preferential
rates (Charitonenko, 2003). The way was open to entrepreneurs or
cooperatives to own rural banks. That is not to say that Philippine
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rural banking was always successful or that government assistance
was not without a price. In the 1970s, BSP forced rural banks to
act as a conduit for unsecured loans to rice farmers by threatening
to fund new competitors if they did not cooperate. The loan program was a disaster, creating economic hardship and even bankruptcy for some rural banks. Similarly, Indonesia began deregulating
the financial sector in the 1980s by liberalizing interest rates. The
government has tried to strengthen the Central Bank since 1998
(Afwan & Charitonenko, 2003). Sri Lanka addressed the issues
across several areas: the policy environment, the legal framework,
regulation and supervision, money and capital markets, and support
institutions. Sri Lankan government support was not always beneficial. Government subsidization and debt forgiveness significantly
compromised movement toward best business practices and sustainable viability of the microfinance industry (Charitonenko & de
Silva, 2002).
The governments of Bangladesh, Chile, Sri Lanka, and
Indonesia directly subsidized microfinance lending for selected
institutions, sometimes causing serious harm to those outside the
orbit of such aid (Charitonenko & de Silva, 2002). In Chile, the focus
of the subsidies was the country’s largest banks. MFIs were
bypassed even though they had built a base of 81,000 loan clients
over ten years. Quickly, the three largest banks attracted 70,000
microcredit clients (CGAP, 2001). NGO-established MFIs, locked
out of the subsidization program because it was open only to regulated banks, eventually closed down. Many MFI employees ended
up working for banks in their microcredit departments. While
profitability was not up to the standards of other sectors of Chilean
banks, efficiencies achieved by economies of scale aided by government subsidies made loans more available. More of the poor may
have been assisted by the government subsidized expansion of
microfinance lending in the end, but the process destroyed existing
MFIs.
Since MFIs are costly to operate, the ability to set interest rates
high enough to cover operating expenses is crucial to survival.
Government laws capping usury rates can be restricted to regulated
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institutions or in some cases extend to all lending institutions in
the economy. In Nicaragua, where the microfinance industry has
grown rapidly in both rural and urban areas, the legislature capped
all loan interest rates at such low levels, reportedly at the behest of
the commercial banks in the country, that the survival of microfinance organizations was threatened. Since the cost of administering small loans is higher for MFIs than the cost of administering
larger sized bank loans, MFI profit margins are particularly susceptible to the imposition of interest rate caps. In 1986, ACP
Group in Peru had become the largest MFI lender in Latin America
with over $5.8 million in loans and better than nine thousand borrowers (Campion, Dunn & Arbuckle, 2001). To fight inflation, the
government capped interest rates at 32% in 1987, an extremely
unrealistic figure, as inflation rates climbed to over 7,000%. By the
following year ACP’s loan portfolio was below $100,000 and two
of its four branches had closed. Fujimori’s election led to reforms
that lifted the usury cap in 1990. ACP expanded its loan portfolio
to $6.8 million and 19,100 clients. Though inflation was also
down, ACP still had to charge an effective annual interest rate of
125%. Without the ability to adjust interest rates, ACP would certainly not have been able to expand or possibly even survive.

Progress and Challenges to MFI Transformation
Ideally a country’s political and economic climate should nurture
new financial institutions. Some specific legal and economic conditions that are seen as favorable to the growth and prosperity of
financial institutions include the following:
• The elimination of policies that inhibit transformation,
such as rate caps on commercial institutions.
• The elimination of government sponsored loan programs
that undercut private and NGO sector loans.
• A legal system that allows for the creation, registration, and
repossession of claims against borrowers.
• Banking supervision that both regulates and assists in the
mobilization of savings.
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• The existence of both money markets for short-term credit
and capital markets for longer term funds.
• The existence of institutions or the ability to create institutions that compile credit information, credit rating, and
collections agencies.
• MFI trade organizations that provide training and technical
support (Campion & White, 2001).
Favorable conditions did exist in Sri Lanka, so much so that
microcredit saturation is reported to be around 80%. Some of
these MFIs are at a fairly early stage of transformation. A few
NGO-sponsored MFIs were attempting to transform, but most
were economically unsustainable. There is limited involvement in
microfinance by commercial banks. Government policies and interventions now discourage new entrants into microfinance and
hinder the transformation of existing MFIs (Charitonenko & de
Silva, 2002). Saturation of the microcredit market “Has led to
many cases of over-indebtedness and appears to be undermining
the primary incentive to repay . . . increasingly, clients appear
willing to default . . . safe in the knowledge they can access the
financial services from one of its competitors if follow on loans are
not made available” (Wright, Christen & Matin, 2001). In
Bangladesh, the government estimates that 45% of the population,
or 12.2 million families, are poor. If this estimate is correct, the
microcredit market is largely saturated, with MFIs reaching more
than 70% of the poor households (Charitonenko & Rahman,
2002).
Bolivia was also fertile ground for MFIs. The number of
microfinance lenders reached such high levels in the 1990s that
borrowers began to obtain loans from one MFI to repay another
(Rhyne, 2001). By 2002 as much as 34% of all Bolivian MFI loan
portfolios were for borrowers with obligations at more than one
MFI. Insolvency at some institutions and excessive debt burdens
forced the government to intercede.
The tendency to subsidize interest rates to borrowers and to
forgive loans during adverse weather conditions was perhaps the
most inhibiting factor faced by MFIs in Indonesia as they moved
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towards transformation (Afwan & Charitonenko, 2003). Sri Lanka
was also hampered by government intervention, which had a chilling effect on organizations considering transformation to regulated
status (Charitonenko & de Silva, 2002).
Many MFI boards and NGO sponsors are reluctant to consider
transformation to regulated status, fearing that the founding mission of serving the poor will be lost in the pursuit of profits.
Focusing on profits can raise the size of the average loan, effectively
locking out the poorest of the poor. By contrast, mission drift may
be low in semi-formal MFIs that are content with serving a localized market on a competitive basis (Charitonenko & de Silva,
2002).
Indonesia had a sound regulatory framework, but with lax
enforcement MFIs circumvented regulations banning the use of
savings deposits to finance loans. Indonesia lacks deposit insurance—there is no deposit insurance institution—and public savings have reached 70% of total bank assets, which makes the
lending of deposits even more dangerous without appropriate
supervision and control. Indonesia also lacks a Credit Information
Bureau and like Sri Lanka lacks microfinance training centers
(Afwan & Charitonenko, 2003).
MFIs in Sri Lanka overemphasized the social mission, which in
turn curtailed progress towards transformation. In Sri Lanka there
is a legacy of ad hoc debt forgiveness that damages the repayment
culture. Sri Lankan cooperatives mobilized over 1 billion Sri
Lankan Rupees (US$11.2 million), but an inadequate legal and
regulatory framework places customers’ funds at risk. Most MFIs
in Sri Lanka consider transformation to a regulated bank as the
best survival option, but the high minimum capital requirement—
500 Million Sri Lanka Rupees (US$5.6 million)—is likely to be
difficult to meet (Charitonenko & de Silva, 2002).
In Indonesia, transformation has allowed large scale, sustainable microfinance outreach. Indonesian MFIs are averse to the
term transformation and instead invoke the phrase greater business
orientation. The more “business oriented” MFIs have a good record
in reaching the poor and have not experienced significant mission
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drift. However, MFIs have not had to deal with competition from
new entrants.
Indonesia’s Bank Rakyat (BRI) is the largest microcredit institution in the world. It is also 100% state owned. Such market
dominance can inhibit other MFIs from making the transition to
regulated institutions that would entail greater scrutiny and reporting requirements. Only a few Indonesian NGOs have made efforts
to formalize their microfinance activities. Prohibited from mobilizing savings deposits for use in loan portfolios, they set up credit
unions to circumvent the law. Moslem religious prohibitions
against usury are another impediment to lending practices in
Indonesia. Here government-sponsored changes in the late 1990s
to banking laws have paved the way to creative lending that accommodated the ban on charging interest (Afwan & Charitonenko,
2003). In the Philippines, restrictions on MFI access to mobilizing
savings are more flagrantly violated. Many MFIs regularly loan savings, effectively challenging regulatory authorities to intervene
(Campion & White, 2001).
In Peru, APC faced two choices when it considered transformation to regulated status in 1994. One choice, Financieras,
required capitalization of $3 million, less than the second choice of
the traditional full-service bank, but Financieras was restricted
from offering savings accounts and other banking services
(Campion, Dunn & Arbuckle, 2001). Later in 1994 legislation
created a third alternative specifically designed for MFIs, the
EDPYME, with an even lower capital requirement of $256,000.
EDPYME organizations were to be a first step in a transformation
process eventually leading to becoming a full service bank.
Mobilizing savings deposits, however, was barred until the transformation was complete. The cautious step-by-step approach
appealed to ACP until Fujimori, after attending a Microfinance
Summit in 1997, proposed establishing a full-fledged microfinance
bank in Peru. Rather than create a new MFI institution, Fujimori
saw ACP, the largest MFI, with capitalization exceeding the $5.6
million minimum, as the logical choice. The new entity would also
be permitted to collect passbook savings.
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The Haitian Banking Sector
The National Bank of Haiti (BRH) was founded in 1880 but did
not assume the role of a national bank until 1934 (U.S.
Department of the Army, 1989). Since then it has had multiple
roles, including the issuance of Haitian currency, the gourde.
Under 1979 legislation, BRH gained authority to control credit,
and to set interest rates and reserve requirements. It exercised that
authority in the 1980s to implement conservative monetary policy
requiring high reserves and low interest rates on loans made by the
country’s commercial banks. This policy effectively limited credit
availability, slowing the economy and curtailing inflation.
The bulk of banking profits were made on the spread between
the interest rates banks could earn on their investments and what
they paid out to depositors. With rates on deposits low, commercial banking was a money machine. In the 1980s imposed caps on
loan rates made commercial bank lending unprofitable and undesirable, particularly when money could be made on the spread
between rates paid and investment returns. Private-sector lending
beyond the purview of banking regulation supplied loans at very
high rates. The poor had access to loans only from loan sharks,
who were often brutal in collecting overdue debts. It was not until
the 1990s that NGO-sponsored microfinance institutions began
making loans available to the poor. MFIs were unregulated and
outside the imposed BRH rate caps, though not beyond a prohibition barring access to deposits for their loan portfolios.

MFI Players in Haiti
There are many microfinance institutions in Haiti (see Table 1) but
none offers the type of services and geographical reach of Fonkoze.
With branches in outlying rural areas, where 95% of its clients are
located, Fonkoze serves the rural poor as a lender and as a deposit
institution, though those deposits are eventually transferred and
held by commercial institutions. Fonkoze’s average loan size is well
below average loans provided by other Haitian MFIs (Table 1)
because of its dedication to serving the poor. Remittance services,
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Table 1. Comparison of Haitian MFIs (June 2002)
Outstanding
portfolio
US$1 ,432 mil.

No. of
active
loans
4283

Average
outstanding
balance
US$334

FHAF

US$1 ,431 mil.

2951

US$484

N/A

FONDESPOIR

US$1 ,126 mil.

3645

US$308

N/A

FONKOZE

US$1 ,128 mil.

10000

BUH

US$2 ,349 mil.

3000

SOGESOL

US$2 ,197 mil.

5522

US$113
US$783
(US$1500 in
Po rt-au-Prince)
US$366

US$3,152 mil

2500

US$1260

Institution
ACME

MCN

Interest rate (monthly)
3% flat + applicat ion fee

3% + application fee
3% flat + applicat ion fee
3%, 5% flat + application fee
5% declining balance +
application fee

Source: Microfinanza Ltd. 2002 and Fonkoze

i.e., money transfers from outside Haiti done affordably, as well as
foreign exchange services are not found at other MFIs.
In the early 1990s Haitian bank regulators removed interest
rate caps, motivating three commercial banks to offer microfinance
loans (Gonzalez, 2001). As in Chile, commercial banks were building on the success of NGO-backed MFIs, but unlike in Chile, the
only help from the government was the lifting of interest rate caps
to create a level playing field. With 80% of Haiti’s workforce selfemployed (CIA, 2004), the market for small loans is large. The
sophistication of borrowers, however, is limited, as it is in Sri
Lanka or Indonesia.
Legislation that removed interest rate caps from commercial
banks and lowered equity requirements opened the way for large
scale commercial lending as well as the expansion of commercial
banks into microfinance (Accion International, 2000). In 2000,
following these reforms, Sogebank, a major commercial bank, created Sogesol as a joint stock company to be its entrant in the
microfinance market. Sogesol planned to rely on Accion
International for advice. Profits were to be the focus of Sogesol
business—not an unusual focus for a commercial bank but somewhat different from the typical orientation of NGO-supported
MFIs that emphasized social benefits (Gonzalez, 2001). Another
departure from NGO-run MFIs was Sogesol’s collateral requirement. Loans would only be made to borrowers able to pledge
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collateral, which could include appliances, beds, or other household goods. Collateral requirements have locked the poor out of
capital markets in the past, i.e., commercial bank loans. Borrowers
with collateral are not the poorest of the poor, making Sogesol’s
clientele only slightly down market from Sogebank’s clients but
unlike many of Fonkoze’s clients who lacked collateral, particularly
first-time borrowers. In its first year, Sogesol had 700 clients.
Sogesol’s client base rapidly expanded to over 5500 clients, with a
loan portfolio just under $2.2 million. While Sogesol was effectively a regulated MFI, the fact that it attained this status because
it was a joint stock company owned by an already regulated commercial bank, Sogebank, did not offer any guidance or procedures
that BRH could follow in reviewing Fonkoze’s application for
regulated status.
Established in 1999 as a joint stock company, Micro Credit
National (MCN) is 50% owned by Haiti’s number two bank,
Unibank S.A., and the remainder is held by three NGOs (IMI,
2003). Loan sizes are large by MFI measures, averaging $1,000,
though MCN also has low end loans and high end loans up to
$20,000. Operations are in Port-au-Prince and ten other cities,
with 36 loan officers. As of 2002, MCN’s loan portfolio was over
$3.5 million and its clients numbered 2500.
In 1997 with assistance of loan guarantees from USAID,
Banque de l’Union Haitienne, a commercial bank, established a
microfinance subsidary BUH to provide microcredit to the poor
(USAID, 2003). By 1999 BUH had 14 branches, including 8 outside of Port-au-Prince. BUH’s loan portfolio in 2002 was over $2.3
million, with 3,000 active loans. Forty percent of BUH’s loans are
in the Port-au-Prince market and the average loan is also at the
higher end: $1500 in Port-au-Prince and $783 elsewhere.
Association pour la Cooperacion avec la Micro (ACME) is an
NGO-operated MFI founded by a Belgian professional in 1997
(Microfinanza, 2002). Like Fonkoze, ACME is registered as an
association in Port-au-Prince. Since it is not a regulated financial
institution and is not owned by a commercial bank, it has limits on
its sources of funds. It has managed to borrow from commercial
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banks, which insist on 100% equity to back loans to ACME. With
such loans composing the bulk of its funding, leverage to grow the
loan portfolio is limited. Bank loans also charge interest rates of
18–24%. To make up for these high rates and the high cost of doing
business, effective annual rates on ACME loans were 74–83% in
2002 (Microfinanza, 2002). Rates consisted of a flat 3% monthly
rate plus fees. Borrowers seeking loans do not have to pledge collateral but they do need a fixed residence, a business that has been
in operation for six to nine months, and a loan guarantor who is
not an ACME client and who has an annual income at least triple
the loan amount requested. Nearly all loans are for six month periods, averaging just over $500 in 2002. ACME puts a $2,000 cap
on loans. Twenty-four loan officers administer loans. Loans are
made on a commercial bank account from which borrowers withdraw money by ACME-issued check and to which borrowers make
deposits as payments. Clients perceive ACME as being friendlier
than banks and its staff as motivated and qualified. ACME provides no other services, such as training in business practices or
literacy, both provided by Fonkoze. Incentives paid to loan officers
succeeded in lowering an 18.7% PAR (portfolio at risk) in 2000 to
just 4.48% in 2002. But the tilt of the incentives toward larger
loans also resulted in 50% of the PAR being concentrated in
smaller loans. Collecting on bad loans is a slow and tedious process
due to inefficiencies within the Haitian court system, but ACME
has managed to collect on over 20% of the loans it writes off. In
2002 ACME had a loan portfolio of $1.4 million and over 4300
active loans (Microfinanza, 2002). It has also managed to attain
sustainability; revenues exceeded costs in both 2001 and 2002.
ACME recognizes the advantages of becoming either a cooperative
or a commercial bank but does not have plans to pursue regulated
status in the immediate future.
Interest rates on loans may be stated on a rate per month basis
but a hidden aspect of these loans that makes them less comparable
is the principal to which the interest rate is applied. Sogesol’s 3%
monthly rate appears comparable to Fonkoze’s loan rate (Table 1)
but it is considerably higher. Sogesol borrowers repay principal
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over the course of the loan installments but the interest they continue to pay is on the initial amount borrowed. It is not interest on
the declining balance, typical of installment loans. Fonkoze borrowers pay interest only on the declining balance. For example,
assuming both Sogesol and Fonkoze charge the same application
fee and the total loan is $500 for six months at 3% per month, the
effect of Sogesol applying interest to the initial amount borrowed
for the entire six-month period and collecting equal installments
results in monthly payments of $98.33 versus $92.30 for Fonkoze’s
loan. Sogesol’s actual monthly rate is 4.94%, which approximates
the 5% rate charged by MCN on declining balances.
The launching of a new MFI trade organization in Haiti,
DAI/FINNET, is a positive development. DAI/FINNET has begun
to keep track of borrower credit information. One difficulty in
compiling such information is that the poor often lack proper
addresses. Note that one of ACME’s requirements is that borrowers have a residence with a fixed address.

Fonkoze: Planning a Commercial Transformation
Making the transformation in Haiti is more of a challenge than in
many other developing countries. Haitian capital markets are
nonexistent, the legal system is in tatters, and BRH is largely without the means to properly supervise and regulate. In Haiti, the lack
of infrastructure makes normal business decisions risky. If the judicial and supervisory agencies were functional, the governor of the
Central Bank would provide a list of instructions to the applicant
MFI, which would guide the process through transformation.
MFIs seeking other avenues to access savings could have considered becoming cooperative banks. In 2000, Caisses Populaires
(CP) or savings cooperatives began expanding in Haiti. Government regulation created a boom in this banking segment with a
2001 anti-money-laundering law that forced drug money from
commercial banks into less regulated CPs (Microfinanza, 2002).
Competition for deposits heated up, with promised interest rate of
10–12% per month, much higher than annual rates offered by commercial banks. CP deposits reached $200 million. The pyramid
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scheme imploded when the volume of savings inflow slowed after
the rush to move drug money into CPs. Soon interest rate payments halted and CPs limited withdrawals. Rioting and even burning of CPs followed. The government was forced to pay off some
of the deposits but the reputation of cooperatives was tarnished.
This black mark against savings cooperatives effectively eliminated
such a transformation alternative for Fonkoze.
With Haiti under siege internationally in 2001 and aid cut off
following the parliamentary elections of 2000, just when Fonkoze
began pursuing transformation, it was unlikely that Aristide could
have undertaken an MFI transformation initiative. Transformation
to become a regulated bank would have to be proposed and managed by Fonkoze and BRH. On May 28, 2001, Fonkoze wrote to
Gustave Flaubert, Haitian Minister of Finance and Economy; Fritz
Jean, Governor of the Bank of the Republic of Haiti; and Staley
Theard, Haitian Minister of Commerce and Industry, proposing a
transformation to a commercial bank. The new entity would be
a stock company, with 40–49% owned by the foundation currently
managing Fonkoze. A minimum of 51% of the stock would be
owned by Haitians. Dismissing the idea of becoming a cooperative
in the letter, Fonkoze proposed a gradual process. First it would
become a provisional commercial bank, with $500,000 deposited
in escrow. Fonkoze would seek further funding to achieve full status as a commercial bank, with $3 million in equity.
Fonkoze reorganized itself into the Fonkoze Foundation and
Bank Fonkoze. There would be two distinct boards. The funds that
Fonkoze USA raised for the bank were turned over to a new entity,
Fonkoze LLC. Through a private offering memorandum, Fonkoze
LLC would in turn invest in Fonkoze SA, a holding company that
would control the regulated Bank Fonkoze. With $2.5 million in
funds raised, more than any prior Haitian bank had raised at
startup, Bank Fonkoze was well financed.
Fonkoze’s 2003 application for transformation to regulated
status languished in the waning months of the Aristide regime. In
2004 Fonkoze management discovered that the application was
dismissed in an August 2003 BRH report which questioned the
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capitalization of the proposed bank. The report was never delivered
to Fonkoze. The negative report revealed a basic misunderstanding
of the complex structure of Fonkoze. Although Fonkoze was well
capitalized, the main objection voiced in the report to moving forward with regulated status was doubt about Fonkoze’s ability to
honor its obligations in the event of financial failure.
Fonkoze’s board of directors, frustrated with the lack of
progress, considered an alternative strategy that would provide
legal access to savings deposits. MFIs in the Dominican Republic
similarly barred from using savings deposits in their loan portfolios
had found a way to circumvent banking regulation. They accessed
savings by creating a new debt instrument to “sell” to the public.
MFIs issued notes instead of deposit slips as a form of acknowledgement of the receipt of funds. Would-be depositors became
creditors loaning money to the MFIs at fixed interest rates. The
MFIs could then legally use these “borrowed” funds to finance
their loan portfolios.
With the departure of Aristide and the installation of Acting
Prime Minister Latortue, the possibility of moving forward with
regulated status was reopened. Latortue was known to be favorably
disposed to MFIs—his daughter was an official with the
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). In May of 2004
Latortue assured Fonkoze that bureaucratic stumbling blocks
would be removed. However, it soon became apparent that the new
administration and BRH had many other pressing issues to
address, relegating Fonkoze’s application to further delay.
The board pursued the option of using a credit instrument
with which to turn deposits into loans. A new entity, Fonkoze
Financial Services (FFS), was created to supercede Fonkoze Bank as
an interim step toward becoming a regulated bank. It was to handle
the new credit instruments. There would need to be training sessions for Fonkoze employees and new forms and procedures would
need to be designed. Following legal advice, Fonkoze conferred
with BRH and explained their intention of using credit instruments instead of deposit slips. BRH was amenable to the change
but went further with a simpler solution. Each existing depositor
120

Volume 7 Number 2

Microfinance Institutions in Transition

was simply to sign an agreement granting permission to Fonkoze to
manage their savings. The process of gaining access to deposits
would not only be streamlined, it would effectively be approved by
BRH.
Prior to transferring funds from Fonkoze LLC to FFS, LLC
investors asked that a pilot project be run at two rural branches
and at a branch in Port-au-Prince. The change would be explained
to depositors and they would be asked for written approval. Rural
depositors were unanimous in their approval, while 85% approved
in Port-au-Prince. The lower approval rating in Port-au-Prince was
mainly because some depositors were unable to consider the proposed change, due to time constraints. Fonkoze LLC authorized
conversion of the MFI to FFS, which would serve as a transitional
entity. The $2.5 million raised and currently in escrow in the US
would be released to Fonkoze LLC and eventually to FFS.
Fonkoze would effectively obviate the urgent need to transform
into a regulated bank.
FFS was not required to adhere to banking regulations since it
would not be a regulated bank. Fonkoze’s board, however, continued to focus on the need for best practices. Planning for a future
transformation, the board mandated that the new entity act as if it
were regulated and meet BRH standards as well as international
standards under the Basle accords. BRH standards required 31% of
deposits be held as reserves. The only exception to strict adherence
to BRH regulations would be that FFS would keep the 31%
reserves in dollars and deposits in US banks rather than in Haitian
currency on deposit with BRH.
Fonkoze has been reconstituted into two separate entities. The
first entity is a continuation of the original foundation, which will
continue to provide educational programs for new borrowers and
serve as an incubator for new branches by financing and operating
them. A subset of the first entity will manage cooperative agricultural loans. Cooperative agricultural loans are a relatively new
product in Haiti. Haitian farmers have been encouraged and given
help to grow crops for export, but there was no existing entity to
purchase those crops and aggregate shipments. The agricultural
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cooperatives lacked funding to carry-over the several month period
between buying crops from farmers and receiving payments from
outside the country. Fonkoze entered into the business of providing loans to agricultural cooperatives, initially with a loan guarantee program sponsored by USAID. That guarantee program
expired without any guarantees being invoked. The foundation will
continue to provide cooperative loans. The second entity, FFS,
will operate the established bank branches and manage savings
deposits, foreign remittances, and foreign exchange. Small business
loans, which are typically longer-term, for larger amounts, and with
men being the predominant clientele, will be managed by FFS.
Fonkoze has used the Grameen model (Grameen, 2004) in
organizing its borrowers into solidarity groups of four or five
clients. Under the Grameen model between 1996 and 2001 there
were 601 NGOs operating as MFIs in Bangladesh. The loan recovery rate had reached over 95% in 2001. There were over 8 million
borrowers and over 11 million active members in Bangladesh
(Charitonenko & Rahman, 2002). Fonkoze clientele lack collateral; relying on solidarity groups for social collateral, as Grameen
does, creates incentives to make payments. Solidarity groups centralize contact between credit officers and clients. The ability of
loan officers to meet with large groups of clients makes for greater
efficiency. Currently loan officers service 320 clients. Postregulatory projections anticipate that experienced credit officers could
oversee thirteen centers consisting of a maximum of 520 clients.
Fonkoze’s fully operational small branches typically include a manager, two credit officers, two cashiers, two security guards, and one
custodian. Managers are expected to handle up to 200 clients in
addition to other tasks.
Banco Solidario in Bolivia was an MFI that employed groupbased lending exclusively prior to becoming the first MFI to make
the transition to a regulated institution. Bolivian MFI lending
quickly evolved toward individual loans, which in 2000 composed
78% of loans, up from just 41% in 1997 (Rhyne, 2001). Fonkoze
began with group loans and until recently they composed 90% of
lending activity, mainly to groups of entrepreneurial women.
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Solidarity groups went through education and literacy programs
together and borrowed together, albeit for different individual
needs. Graduates from solidarity groups were eligible for individual loans. Graduates have successfully completed the second phase
of Fonkoze’s business training program and have previously repaid
all their loans on time. It is likely that individual loans will make
up an increasingly greater portion of Fonkoze’s portfolio.
Becoming a regulated bank can often mean larger, more profitable loans and mission creep away from an emphasis on serving
the poor. Fonkoze’s strategy to avoid this is to leave the more charitable, not-for-profit operations to the Foundation. The poor will
continue to be served and perhaps served even better. One new
Foundation-based program will provide loans to poorer women
not currently served by Fonkoze. The requirement for a savings
account will be postponed and dues will be paid over the course of
time. Loans will be made to solidarity groups in smaller sums and
the women will receive basic literacy and educational services.

Conclusion
The following continuum describes typical MFI progress toward
transformation:
• Adoption of a professional, businesslike approach to MFI
administration and operation.
• Progression towards operational and financial self-sufficiency.
• Use of commercial sources of funds.
• Operation as a for-profit formal financial institution subject
to regulation and supervision (Afwan & Charitonenko,
2003).
Fonkoze has attained a professional and businesslike approach.
It has been hampered from moving toward the second phase of
transition, sustainability, because of a lack of access to savings
deposits and the need, defined by its mission, to provide social welfare programs. To continue to provide social welfare programs and
attain profitability, Fonkoze’s board came up with a plan to divide
Fonkoze into two entities: the original foundation that would
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focus on welfare programs and seek funding through donations
and a bank that would eventually attain regulated status.
Turmoil in Haiti and a lack of understanding of the complexity of Fonkoze’s tiered structure resulted in delay and denial of the
initial plan to become a fully regulated institution, even though
funding requirements were met. Fonkoze devised another plan that
would create a transitional entity, Fonkoze Financial Services
(FFS), which would circumvent the government ban against nonregulated institutions loaning savings. FFS was approved by BRH.
Savings would be considered “loans” to Fonkoze by depositors and
as such would then be legally available for its loan portfolio. Not
only did BRH approve of the plan, it suggested speeding up the
process by simply obtaining approval from current depositors to
allow FFS to manage their money.
FFS is a transitional vehicle which will conduct business as if
it were already a regulated institution while preparing for the final
transformation into a commercial bank. That final transformation
will be delayed until a more stable political situation develops in
Haiti. While this is not a predictable and smooth progression
toward attaining transformation, as has been accomplished in
other countries, Fonkoze has taken the first step to move through
the transformation continuum as quickly as the political situation
allows. FFS will for all intents and purposes function as if it were
a regulated bank.
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